1) Prepare a 700 word paper describing survey research and data collection as they relate to criminal justice research. Address each of the following in your paper:Identify the various types of survey research utilized in the field of criminal justice.Explain the advantages and disadvantages of: In person surveysTelephone surveysComputer-based surveysFocus group surveysDescribe the purpose of sampling as part of the research process.Identify the types of reliability and validity as they are applied to criminal justice research.Discuss the importance of ensuring that data collection methods and instruments are both reliable and valid.Include at least four peer-reviewed references.Format your paper consistent with APA guidelines.2) SeperateHelp me write up a 200 word research proposal that includes the following on focusing on Police patrol vs. areas that are not patrolled (crime statistics). I have attached an article to help. State your research problem. (200 word)Explain the background of the research problem. (200 word)Please include at least 1 or 2 peer review referencesFormat your paper consistent with APA guidelines.
policing_crime_and_disorder_hot_spots__a_randomized_controlled_trial.pdf

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POLICING CRIME AND DISORDER HOT
SPOTS: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED
TRIAL*
ANTHONY A. BRAGA
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Boalt Hall School of Law
University of California, Berkeley
BRENDA J. BOND
Sawyer Business School
Suffolk University
Dealing with physical and social disorder to prevent serious crime
has become a central strategy for policing. This study evaluates the
effects of policing disorder, within a problem-oriented policing framework, at crime and disorder hot spots in Lowell, Massachusetts. Thirty*
This research was supported under Award 2004-DB-BX-0014 from the Bureau of
Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice
through the Programs Division of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public
Safety. The authors would like to thank former Superintendent Edward Davis,
Superintendent Kenneth Lavallee, Captain Thomas Kennedy, Captain John
Flaherty, Captain Jack Webb, Lieutenant Barry Golner, Lieutenant Paul
Laferriere, Lieutenant Kevin Sullivan, Lieutenant Kelly Richardson, Lieutenant
Frank Rouine, Lieutenant Mark Buckley, Sergeant Steve O’Neil, Officer Mark
Trudel, Meghan Moffett, John Reynolds, Sara Khun, and other officers and staff
of the Lowell Police Department for their valuable assistance in the completion
of this research. Jesse Jannetta, Russell Wolff, Carl Walter, and Deborah Braga
deserve much credit for their assistance with data collection and analysis. John
Laub, Robert Sampson, Chris Winship, Denise Gottfredson, and three
anonymous reviewers provided helpful comments that greatly improved the
quality of the research. Finally, we would like to thank Sarah Lawrence for her
support and patience in the successful completion of this research project. The
points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice, Massachusetts
Executive Office of Public Safety, or Lowell Police Department. Direct
correspondence to Anthony A. Braga, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (e-mail: anthony_
braga@ksg.harvard.edu).
 2008 American Society of Criminology
CRIMINOLOGY
VOLUME 46
NUMBER 3
2008
577
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BRAGA & BOND
four hot spots were matched into 17 pairs, and one member of each
pair was allocated to treatment conditions in a randomized block field
experiment. The officers engaged “shallow” problem solving and
implemented a strategy that more closely resembled a general policing
disorder strategy rather than carefully designed problem-oriented policing responses. Nevertheless, the impact evaluation revealed significant
reductions in crime and disorder calls for service, and systematic observations of social and physical disorder at the treatment places relative
to the control places uncovered no evidence of significant crime displacement. A mediation analysis of the isolated and exhaustive causal
mechanisms that comprised the strategy revealed that the strongest
crime-prevention gains were generated by situational prevention strategies rather than by misdemeanor arrests or social service strategies.
KEYWORDS: problem-oriented policing, hot spots, disorder, broken
windows
Crime policy scholars, primarily James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, and practitioners, such as Los Angeles Police Chief William J. Bratton, have argued for years that when police pay attention to minor
offenses—such as aggressive panhandling, prostitution, and graffiti—they
can reduce fear, strengthen communities, and prevent serious crime (Bratton and Kelling, 2006; Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Spurred by claims of
large declines in serious crime after the approach was adopted in New
York City, dealing with physical and social disorder, or “fixing broken windows,” has become a central element of crime-prevention strategies
adopted by many American police departments (Kelling and Coles, 1996;
Sousa and Kelling, 2006). The general idea of dealing with disorderly conditions to prevent crime is found in a myriad of police strategies that range
from “order maintenance” and “zero tolerance” policing strategies in
which the police attempt to impose order through strict enforcement to
“community” and “problem-oriented policing” strategies in which police
attempt to produce order and reduce crime through cooperation with
community members and by addressing specific recurring problems
(Cordner, 1998; Eck and Maguire, 2000; Skogan, 2006; Skogan et al.,
1999). Although its application can vary within and across police departments, policing disorder to prevent crime is now a common crime-control
strategy.
The available research evidence, however, does not demonstrate consistent connections between disorder and more serious crime (Harcourt,
1998; Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999; Skogan, 1990; Taylor, 2001). Evaluations of the crime-control effectiveness of policing disorder strategies also
yield conflicting results. In New York City, for example, it is unclear
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whether “broken windows” policing can claim any credit for the 1990s
crime drop (Eck and Maguire, 2000; Karmen, 2000) with evaluations
reporting significant reductions in violent crime (Corman and Mocan,
2005; Kelling and Sousa, 2001), modest reductions in violent crime (Messner et al., 2007; Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Rengifo, 2007), and no evidence
of reductions in violent crime (Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006). These conflicting results have generated questions regarding the crime-prevention
value of dealing with physical and social disorder. As others have
observed (e.g., Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006; Skogan and Frydl, 2004), given
the strong influence of broken windows on the policing field, remarkably
little solid research evidence is found on the crime-control benefits of
policing disorder.
Most prior studies that examine the effectiveness of broken windows
policing in preventing crime suffer from two important limitations. First,
many evaluations engage nonexperimental and quasi-experimental designs
that infer causation by observing changes in police actions and attempting
to account for rival causal factors through statistical controls and elaborate
model specification exercises. Although these efforts are laudable, randomized controlled experiments remove many uncertainties associated
with the other approaches through their high internal validity and strong
ability to demonstrate the effect of one factor over another. Second, most
studies use increased numbers of misdemeanor arrests as a proxy measure
for policing disorder interventions or a simple dummy variable to
represent a package of policing disorder interventions. As will be discussed, dealing with disorderly conditions requires an array of activities,
such as securing abandoned buildings, removing trash from the street, and
managing homeless populations, which are not captured in one-dimensional misdemeanor arrest measures. Although dummy variables can
represent a set of police actions that constitute a policing disorder strategy,
such analyses do not unravel the key elements of the strategy that may or
may not be associated with observable changes in crime. This study
advances our knowledge on the effects of policing disorder on crime by
using a randomized block experimental design in conjunction with qualitative indicators on local dynamics to evaluate the effects of policing disorder at crime and disorder hot-spot locations in Lowell, Massachusetts. The
study also sheds important insights on the causal pathways of key crimeprevention mechanisms associated with policing disorder approaches:
increased misdemeanor arrests, situational prevention strategies, and
social service actions.
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THE CRIME-CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICING
DISORDER
Although local officials and national observers attribute the violent
crime drop in New York in the 1990s to the adoption of the broken windows policing strategy, many academics argue that it is very difficult to
credit this specific strategy with the surprising reduction in violent crime.
The New York Police Department (NYPD) implemented the broken windows strategy within a larger set of organizational changes framed by the
Compstat management accountability structure for allocating police
resources (Silverman, 1999). As such, it is difficult to establish the independent effects of broken windows policing relative to other strategies
implemented as part of the Compstat process (Weisburd et al., 2003).
Other scholars suggest that several rival causal factors, such as the decline
in New York’s crack epidemic, played a more important role in the crime
drop (Blumstein, 1995; Bowling, 1999). Some academics have argued that
the crime rate was already declining in New York before the implementation of any of the post-1993 police reforms and that New York’s decline in
homicide rates was not significantly different from declines experienced in
surrounding states and in other large cities that did not implement aggressive enforcement policies during that time period (Karmen, 2000; Eck and
Maguire, 2000).
Because the NYPD implemented its post-1993 changes as a citywide
crime-prevention strategy, it was not possible for evaluators to engage a
rigorous evaluation design such as the “gold standard” randomized controlled experiment (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Cook and Campell,
1979). However, a recent series of sophisticated statistical analyses have
examined the effects of policing disorder on violent crime trends in New
York City (Corman and Mocan, 2005; Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006; Kelling
and Sousa, 2001; Messner et al., 2007; Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Rengifo,
2007). These studies represent very careful attempts to determine whether
broken windows policing can be associated with the crime drop in New
York City by statistically controlling for rival causal factors, such as the
decline in New York’s crack epidemic and relevant sociodemographic,
economic, and criminal justice changes over the course of the 1990s. These
studies generally can be distinguished by differences in modeling techniques, dependent variables, time-series length, extensiveness of control
variables included in the analysis, the functional form of control variables,
and measurement levels (e.g., precincts versus boroughs). These studies
commonly use increases in misdemeanor arrests or combined ordinanceviolation and misdemeanor arrests (Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Rengifo,
2007) as the key measures of the NYPD policing disorder strategy. With
the exception of the Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) study, these analyses
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have found statistically significant associations between the NYPD strategy and decreased violent crime, with the effects ranging from small
(Messner et al., 2007; Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Rengifo, 2007) to large
(Corman and Mocan, 2005; Kelling and Sousa, 2001).1
As Kelling and Sousa (2001) admit, the number of misdemeanor arrests
is a very limited measure of the content of broken windows policing strategies. Increasing misdemeanor arrests for panhandling, smoking marijuana,
and public drinking represents only one dimension of maintaining public
order on the street and does not capture other actions that are necessary
to deal with disorderly neighborhood conditions that generate serious
crime problems. A broader set of responses to deal with physical and
social incivilities, such as installing improved street lighting, cleaning up
vacant lots, razing abandoned buildings, and evicting problem residents,
requires activities that go far beyond making misdemeanor arrests. Strategic partnerships with city agencies, social service agencies, local business
owners, community groups, and tenant associations are often necessary to
deal with physical deterioration and social order problems in neighborhoods (Braga, 2002; Skogan, 2006; Taylor, 2006). In addition to the uncertainties associated with determining causal effects in nonexperimental
research designs, the limited measurement of policing disorder treatments
through one-dimensional misdemeanor arrest proxies obscures crime-prevention benefits that may be associated with the full approach. To estimate
the effectiveness of multidimensional programs properly and to understand the causal effects associated with varying mechanisms, the specific
treatments in the program need to be identified and accounted for in an
evaluation design (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman, 2006).
Supporters of broken windows approaches (e.g., Bratton and Kelling,
2006) point to one experimental evaluation as the strongest available evidence that policing disorder strategies have considerable crime-prevention
value. In Jersey City, New Jersey, a randomized controlled experiment
found that a problem-oriented policing strategy focused on social and
physical disorder resulted in significant reductions in citizen calls for service and crime incidents in violent crime hot spots with little evidence of
immediate spatial displacement (Braga et al., 1999). However, a key shortcoming of this study involved the use of a dummy variable to represent the
1.
Other macrolevel analyses have generated results supportive of policing disorder
strategies. In California, controlling for demographic, economic, and deterrence
variables, a county-level analysis revealed that increases in misdemeanor arrests
were associated with significant decreases in felony property offenses (Worrall,
2002). An analysis of robbery rates in 156 American cities revealed that
increased arrests for disorderly conduct and driving under the influence reduced
the number of robberies (Sampson and Cohen, 1988).
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set of police actions that comprised the policing disorder intervention.2
Twenty-eight different types of problem-oriented responses were implemented to alleviate crime and disorder problems at the treatment violent
crime hot spots; these responses included increased misdemeanor arrests
for public drinking, boarding and fencing abandoned buildings, code
inspections of taverns and apartment buildings, and finding shelter and
substance abuse treatment for the homeless (Braga et al., 1999). It is
unknown whether the crime-control gains were generated by arrest-based
order maintenance tactics, situational prevention strategies that modified
the criminal opportunity structure at treatment places, or social service
strategies that attempted to create opportunities for high-risk individuals
that populated the targeted locations. Given the widespread popularity of
broken windows policing, considerable need exists to conduct additional
rigorous evaluations of its crime-control effectiveness and to develop some
much needed empirical evidence on the key elements of the approach that
generate observable preventive benefits.
PROGRAM DESIGN
The program and evaluation design of this study borrows from the
Braga et al. (1999) study that generally followed the well-known steps of
the scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (SARA) model used in
many problem-oriented policing projects (see Eck and Spelman, 1987).
Lowell, Massachusetts, is a small city of some 105,000 residents located
about 30 miles northeast of Boston. During the scanning phase, computerized mapping and database technologies were used to geocode all 2004
crime and disorder emergency citizen calls for service and to identify the
densest clusters of these calls in Lowell.3 Simple temporal analyses and
2.
3.
Two other studies used dummy variables to represent a policing disorder intervention. A quasi-experimental evaluation of a quality-of-life policing initiative
that focused on social and physical disorder in four target zones in Chandler,
Arizona, did not find any significant reductions in serious crime associated with
the strategy (Katz, Webb, and Schaefer, 2001). A less rigorous evaluation of a 1month police enforcement effort to reduce alcohol-related and traffic-related
offenses in a community in a midwestern city also did not find any significant
reductions in the amount of robberies or burglaries that took place in the
targeted area (Novak et al., 1999).
The 2004 crime and disorder calls for service were geocoded using Mapinfo Professional 8.0 mapping software (Pitney Bowes, Troy, NY). The spatial distribution of citizen crime and disorder calls for service was examined using Spatial and
Temporal Analysis of Crime (STAC) and kernel density analytic tools available
from the National Institute of Justice and through Mapinfo’s Vertical Mapper
software. These analytic tools identified the locations of the densest clusters of
calls in each of Lowell’s eight neighborhoods: Pawtucketville, Centralville,
Belvidere, South Lowell, The Highlands, Back Central, Downtown, and The
Acre. These clusters were digitized (polygons were drawn manually around
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ranking procedures were used to identify preliminary hot-spot areas that
had consistently high levels of citizen crime and disorder calls for service
over time. Qualitative data on place characteristics, local dynamics, and
Lowell Police Department (LPD) patrol officer perceptions of crime
problems were used to determine hot-spot area boundaries. To measure
immediate spatial crime displacement and “diffusion of crime-control benefits” effects, all final hot-spot areas were required to include a two-block
catchment area around the perimeter of the place.4 This process left 34
discrete crime and disorder hot-spot areas in Lowell for inclusion in the
experiment. The hot spots accounted for 2.7 percent of Lowell’s 14.5
square miles. In 2004, these places generated 5,125 citizen calls for service
(23.5 percent of 21,810 total crime and disorder calls to the LPD), including 1,214 violent crime calls (29.3 percent of 4,140 total violent crime calls
to the LPD), 1,942 property crime calls (25.1 percent of 7,725 total property calls to the LPD), and 1,969 disorder calls (19.8 percent of 9,945 total
disorder calls to the LPD). After the 34 violent crime places were identified, they were matched into 17 pairs for evaluation purposes (i.e., to be
allocated to control and treatment groups).5
4.
5.
STAC ellipses and the darkest portions of the kernel density grids) into a boundary file of preliminary hot-spot locations. The details of the hot-spot identification process are available by request from the authors.
The two-block catchment area was borrowed from other studies designed to
measure immediate spatial displacement and diffusion (e.g., Braga et al., 1999;
Weisburd and Green, 1995b). As Weisburd and Green (1995a: 354) describe, “we
decided upon a two-block radius for the ‘catchment’ area because we felt it a
reasonable compromise between competing problems of washout of displacement impact and a failure to provide adequate distance to identify immediate
spatial displacement. While we recognized at the outset that we would miss the
movement of crime more than two blocks away from a hot spot, given our measure of crime as a general rather than specific indicator we did not think it practical to identify all potential places that might provide opportunity for displaced
offenders” (see also Green, 1995; Weisburd et al., 2006).
Simple but deliberate matching exercises ensure that any peculiarities found in
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