12 font, times new roman, 1 inch margins, double spaced. Please cite and use MLA formant, do not use anything from the internet. Use the citation list provided as seen necessary to the essay. Imagine a new country is being established in our modern times. Use the readings from the Money and Classical Political Thought section of the course to discuss whether this new country should have a central bank, should peg their currency to the US dollar and whether it should have capital controls. How does this relate to the notion of “money and national power”?Money and Classical Political Thought readings:John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (1689), chapter five.John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (1958), chapter three.John Kenneth Galbraith, Money: Whence it Came, Where it Went (1975), 45-62.Alexander Hamilton, “Notes on the Advantages of a National Bank” (1791). Thomas Jefferson, “Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank.” William Jennings Bryan, “Cross of Gold” speech (1896)John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1919. Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, chapter 7.
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Second Treatise
John Locke
5: Property
24. What I have been discussing is the condition of complete
slavery, which is just a continuation of the state of war
between a lawful conqueror and a captive. If they enter into
any kind of pact—agreeing to limited power on the one side
and obedience on the other—the state of war and slavery
ceases for as long as the pact is in effect. For, as I have
said, no man can by an agreement pass over to someone else
something that he doesn’t himself have, namely a power over
his own life.
I admit that we find among the Jews, as well as other
nations, cases where men sold themselves; but clearly they
sold themselves only into drudgery, not slavery. It is evident
that the person who was sold wasn’t thereby put at the mercy
of an absolute, arbitrary, despotic power; for the master was
obliged at a certain time to let the other go free from his
service, and so he couldn’t at any time have the power to kill
him. Indeed the master of this kind of servant was so far
from having an arbitrary power over his •life that he couldn’t
arbitrarily even •maim him: the loss of an eye or a tooth set
him free (Exodus xxi).
may not rightly take his own life because the fundamental
law of nature says that men are to be preserved as much
as possible (section 16). He continues:] This freedom from
absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to a man’s survival,
so tightly tied to it, that losing it involves losing ·all control
over· his own life. ·That’s why no-one can voluntarily enter
into slavery·. A man doesn’t have the power to take his own
life, so he can’t voluntarily enslave himself to anyone, or put
himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of •someone else
to take away his life whenever •he pleases. Nobody can give
more power than he has; so someone who cannot take away
his own life cannot give someone else such a power over it.
If someone performs an act that deserves death, he has by
his own fault forfeited his own life; the person to whom he
has forfeited it may (when he has him in his power) delay
taking it and instead make use of the offending man for his
own purposes; and this isn’t doing him any wrong, because
whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery to outweigh
the value of his life, he has the power to resist the will of his
master, thus bringing the death that he wants.
Chapter 5: Property
25. God , as King David says (Psalms cxv.16), has given the
earth to the children of men—given it to mankind in common.
This is clear, whether we consider •natural reason, which
tells us that men, once they are born, have a right to survive
and thus a right to food and drink and such other things as
nature provides for their subsistence, or •revelation, which
gives us an account of the grants that God made of the world
to Adam and to Noah and his sons. Some people think that
this creates a great difficulty about how anyone should ever
come to own anything. I might answer ·that difficulty with
another difficulty, saying· that if the supposition that
God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in
common
makes it hard to see how •there can be any individual
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Second Treatise
John Locke
5: Property
27. Though •men as a whole own the earth and all inferior
creatures, every •·individual· man has a property in his own
person [= ‘owns himself’]; this is something that nobody else
has any right to. The labour of his body and the work of
his hands, we may say, are strictly his. So when he takes
something from the state that nature has provided and left it
in, he mixes his labour with it, thus joining to it something
that is his own; and in that way he makes it his property.
ownership, the supposition that
God gave the world to Adam and his successive heirs,
excluding all the rest of his posterity
makes it hard to see how •anything can be owned except by
one universal monarch. But I shan’t rest content with that,
and will try to show ·in a positive way· how men could come
to own various particular parts of something that God gave to
mankind in common, and how this could come about without
any explicit agreement among men in general. [Here and
He has removed the item from the common state that nature
has placed it in, and through this labour the item has had
annexed to it something that excludes the common right of
other men: for this labour is unquestionably the property of
the labourer, so no other man can have a right to anything
the labour is joined to—at least where there is enough, and
as good, left in common for others. [Note Locke’s statement that
throughout this chapter, ‘own’ will often replace Locke’s ‘have a property
in’.]
26. God, who has given the world to men in common,
has also given them reason to make use of it to the best
advantage of life and convenience. The earth and everything
in it is given to men for the support and comfort of their
existence. All the fruits it naturally produces and animals
that it feeds, as produced by the spontaneous hand of nature,
belong to mankind in common; nobody has a basic right—a
private right that excludes the rest of mankind—over any
of them as they are in their natural state. But they were
given for the use of men; and before they can be useful or
beneficial to any particular man there must be some way
for a particular man to appropriate them [= ‘come to own them’].
The wild Indians ·in north America· don’t have fences or
boundaries, and are still joint tenants ·of their territory·; but
if any one of them is to get any benefit from fruit or venison,
the food in question must be his—and his (i.e. a part of him)
in such a way that no-one else retains any right to it. [The
every man ‘has a property in his own person’. He often says that the
whole point of political structures is to protect ‘property’; which might be
sordidly mercantile if he weren’t talking about the protection not just of
man’s physical possessions but also of his life and liberty.]
28. Someone who eats the acorns he picked up under an
oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the forest,
has certainly appropriated them to himself! Nobody can deny
that the nourishment is his. Well, then, when did they begin
to be his?
when he digested them?
when he cooked them?
when he brought them home?
when he picked them up ·under the tree·?
It is obvious that if his first gathering didn’t make them his,
nothing else could do so. That labour •marked those things
off from the rest of the world’s contents; it •added something
to them beyond what they had been given by nature, the
common mother of all; and so they became his private right.
last clause of that is puzzling. Does Locke mean that the Indian can’t
directly get benefit from the venison except by eating it? That seems to
be the only way to make sense of ‘part of him’; but it doesn’t fit well with
the paragraph as a whole.]
11
Second Treatise
John Locke
Suppose we denied this, and said instead:
He had no right to the acorns or apples that he thus
appropriated, because he didn’t have the consent of
all mankind to make them his. It was robbery on his
part to take for himself something that belonged to all
men in common.
If such a consent as that was necessary, men in general
would have starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had
provided them with. We see ·the thesis I am defending at
work in our own society·. When there is some land that
has the status of a common—being held in common by the
community by agreement among them—taking any part of
what is common and removing it from the state nature leaves
it in creates ownership; and if it didn’t, the common would
be of no use. And the taking of this or that part doesn’t
depend on the express consent of all the commoners [= ‘all
those who share in the common ownership of the land’]. Thus when
my horse bites off some grass, my servant cuts turf, or I dig
up ore, in any place where I have a right to these in common
with others, the grass or turf or ore becomes my property,
without anyone’s giving it to me or consenting to my having
it. My labour in removing it out of the common state it was
in has established me as its owner.
5: Property
was the common right of everyone. Those who are counted
as the civilized part of mankind have made and multiplied
positive laws to settle property rights; but ·even· among us
this original law of nature—the law governing how property
starts when everything is held in common—still applies.
[Locke concludes the section with examples: catching a
fish, gathering ambergris, shooting a hare.]
31. You may object that if gathering the acorns etc. creates
a right to them, then anyone may hoard as much as he likes.
I answer: Not so. The very law of nature that in this way
•gives us property also •sets limits to that property. God has
given us all things richly. . . . But how far has he given them
to us? To enjoy [= ‘to use, to get benefit from’; this what ‘enjoy(ment)’
usually means in this work]. Anyone can through his labour
come to own as much as he can use in a beneficial way
before it spoils; anything beyond this is more than his share
and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to
spoil or destroy. For a long time •there could be little room for
quarrels or contentions about property established on this
basis: •there was an abundance of natural provisions and
few users of them; and •only a small part of that abundance
could be marked off by the industry of one man and hoarded
up to the disadvantage of others—especially keeping within
the bounds (set by reason) of what he could actually use.
29. If the explicit consent of every commoner was needed for
anyone to appropriate to himself any part of what is given
in common, children couldn’t cut into the meat their father
had provided for them in common without saying which
child was to have which portion. The water running in the
fountain is everyone’s, but who would doubt that the water
in the pitcher belongs to the person who drew it out?. . . .
32. But these days the chief issue about property concerns
the earth itself rather than the plants and animals that live
on it, because when you own some of the earth you own what
lives on it as well. I think it is clear that ownership of land is
acquired in the same way that I have been describing. A man
owns whatever land he tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and
can use the products of. By his labour he as it were fences
off that land from all that is held in common. Suppose
someone objected:
30. Thus this law of reason makes it the case that the
Indian who kills a deer owns it; it is agreed to belong to the
person who put his labour into it, even though until then it
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Second Treatise
John Locke
He has no valid right to the land, because everyone
else has an equal title to it. So he can’t appropriate
it, he can’t ‘fence it off’, without the consent of all his
fellow-commoners, all mankind.
That is wrong. When God gave the world in common to all
mankind, he •commanded man to work, and •man needed
to work in order to survive. So •God and •his reason commanded man to subdue the earth, i.e. to improve it for the
benefit of life; and in doing that he expended something that
was his own, namely •his labour. A man who in obedience
to this command of God subdued, tilled and sowed any part
of the earth’s surface thereby joined to that land something
that was •his property, something that no-one else had any
title to or could rightfully take from him.
5: Property
who is quarrelsome and contentious. Someone who had land
left for his improvement—land as good as what had already
been taken up—had no need to complain and ought not to
concern himself with what had already been improved by
someone else’s labour. If he did, it would be obvious that he
wanted the benefit of someone else’s work, to which he had
no right, rather than the ground that God had given him in
common with others to labour on. . . .
35. In countries such as England ·now·, where there are
many people living under a government, and where there is
money and commerce, no-one can enclose or appropriate
any part of any common land without the consent of all
his fellow-commoners. That is because land that is held
in common has that status by compact, i.e. by the law of
the land, which is not to be violated. Also, although such
land is held in common by some men, it isn’t held by all
mankind; rather, it is the joint property of this county or
this village. Furthermore, after such an enclosure—·such
a ‘fencing off’·—what was left would not, from the point of
view of the rest of the commoners, be ‘as good’ as the whole
was when they could all make use of the whole. This is quite
unlike how things stood when that great common, the world,
was just starting and being populated. The law that man
was under at that time was in favour of appropriating. God
ordered man to work, and his wants forced him to do so.
That was his property, which couldn’t be taken from him
wherever he had fixed it [those five words are Locke’s]. And so
we see that •subduing or cultivating the earth and •having
dominion [here = ‘rightful control’] are joined together, the former
creating the right to the latter. . . .
33. This appropriation of a plot of land by improving it
wasn’t done at the expense of any other man, because there
was still enough (and as good) left for others—more than
enough for the use of the people who weren’t yet provided for.
In effect, the man who ·by his labour· ‘fenced off’ some land
didn’t reduce the amount of land that was left for everyone
else: someone who leaves as much as anyone else can make
use of does as good as take nothing at all. Nobody could
think he had been harmed by someone else’s taking a long
drink of water, if there was the whole river of the same water
left for him to quench his thirst; and the ·ownership issues
concerning· land and water, where there is enough of both,
are exactly the same.
34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave
it them for their benefit and for the greatest conveniences of
life they could get from it, he can’t have meant it always to
remain common and uncultivated. He gave it for the use of
the reasonable and hard-working man (and labour was to
be his title to it), not to the whims or the greed of the man
36. Nature did well in setting limits to private property
through limits to how much men can work and limits to how
much they need. No man’s labour could tame or appropriate
13
Second Treatise
John Locke
all the land; no man’s enjoyment could consume more than a
small part; so that it was impossible for any man in this way
to infringe on the right of another, or acquire a property to
the disadvantage of his neighbour. . . . This measure confined
every man’s possessions to a very moderate proportion, such
as he might make his own without harming anyone else, in
the first ages of the world when men were more in danger
of •getting lost by wandering off on their own in the vast
wilderness of the earth as it was then than of •being squeezed
for lack of land to cultivate. And, full as the world now seems,
the rule for land-ownership can still be adopted without
harm to anyone. Suppose a family in the state people were
in when the world was first being populated by the children
of Adam, or of Noah: let them plant on some vacant land
in the interior of America. We’ll find that the possessions
they could acquire, by the rule I have given, would not be
very large, and even today they wouldn’t adversely affect
the rest of mankind, or give them reason to complain or
think themselves harmed by this family’s encroachment.
I maintain this despite the fact that the human race has
spread itself to all the corners of the world, and infinitely
outnumbers those who were here at the beginning. Indeed,
the extent of ground is of so little value when not worked on
that I have been told that in Spain a man may be permitted
to plough, sow and reap on land to which his only title is that
he is making use of it. . . . Be this as it may (and I don’t insist
on it), I venture to assert boldly that if it weren’t for just one
thing the same rule of ownership—namely that every man is
to own as much as he could make use of—would still hold in
the world, without inconveniencing anybody, because there
is land enough in the world to suffice twice as many people
as there are. The ‘one thing’ that blocks this is the invention
of money, and men’s tacit agreement to put a value on it;
this made it possible, with men’s consent, to have larger
5: Property
possessions and to have a right to them. I now proceed to
show how this has come about.
37. Men came to want more than they needed, and this
altered the intrinsic value of things: a thing’s value originally
depended only on its usefulness to the life of man; but
men came to agree that a little piece of yellow metal—which
wouldn’t fade or rot or rust—should be worth a great lump of
flesh or a whole heap of corn. Before all that happened, each
man could appropriate by his labour as much of the things of
nature as he could use, without detriment to others, because
an equal abundance was still left to those who would work as
hard on it. ·Locke now moves away from the just-announced
topic of money, and won’t return to it until section 46.· To
which let me add that someone who comes to own land
through his labour doesn’t •lessen the common stock of
mankind but •increases it. That’s because the life-support
provisions produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated
land, are (to put it very mildly) ten times more than what
would come from an acre of equally rich land that was held
in common and not cultivated. So he who encloses land, and
gets more of the conveniences of life from ten ·cultivated·
acres than he could have had from a hundred left to nature,
can truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind. For his
labour now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres that
would have needed a hundred ·uncultivated· acres lying in
common. I have here greatly understated the productivity of
improved land, setting it at ten to one when really it is much
nearer a hundred to one. [Locke defends this by comparing a
thousand acres of ‘the wild woods and uncultivated waste of
America’ with ‘ten acres of equally fertile land in Devonshire,
where they are well cultivated’.]
[He then starts a fresh point: before land was owned,
someone could by gathering fruit or hunting animals come to
own those things, because of the labour he had put into them.
14
Second Treatise
John Locke
But] if they perished in his possession without having been
properly used—if the fruits rotted or the venison putrefied
before he could use it—he offended against the common
law of nature, and was liable to be punished. For he had
encroached on his neighbour’s share, because he had no
right to these things beyond what use they could be to him
to afford him conveniences of life.
5: Property
in common; that the inhabitants didn’t value it or claim
ownership of it beyond making use of it. But when there
came to be insufficient grazing land in the same place, they
separated and enlarged their pasture where it best suited
them (as Abraham and Lot did, Genesis xiii. 5). . . .
39. The supposition that Adam had all to himself authority
over and ownership of all the world, to the exclusion of all
other men, can’t be proved, and anyway couldn’t be the basis
for anyone’s property-rights ·today·. And we don’t need it.
Supposing the world to have been given (as it was) to the
children of men in common, we see how men’s labour could
give them separate titles to different parts of it, for their
private uses; with no doubts about w …
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